Although AICs in West and South Africa arc known to draw large numb ers of adherents from the historic mission churches, this is not the case for Shona adherents in Zimbabwe. About 60% of these had never been full members of any other church. Some had attended and received instruction from the mission churches (Dancel 1987:98 -9) . Anderson found in a survey conducted between 1990-91 in Soshanguvc that between 26% of Pentecostal-type church members and 36% of Ethiopian-type church members had not belonged to any church prior to joining AI Cs. By contrast, 35% of Pcntccostaltypc church members and 39% of Ethiopian -type church members had belonged to a mission church before joining the AICs (Anderson 1992:77) .
Zionists comprise approximately 80% of the AICs. One of the best known Zionist churches is the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) -the largest Zionist denomination . The growth of the ZCC is attributed to several reasons, most similar to those advanced for pentecostal churches, others peculiar to Africa. Sotho-speakers form the larg est single language group within the ZCC at 46.4%; similarly Anderson notes that in Soshanguvc 51.5% of ZCC members were Northern Sotho (Anderson 1992:63) . Many Zionist congregations typically meet outdoors.
Researchers frequently point out that AICs draw recruits from the poorest sectors of society. Of all AIC categories in the HSRC's 1993 survey, "Other African independent churches" (i.e. excluding the Zion Christian Church , Ethiopians, and Apostolics) had the lowest income and education levels. Almost 64% of all nominal "other" AICs members belonged to households who cam less than R600 per month, while 64.2% had a "Std. 3 or less" education . An estimated 50.3% ofZCC members were part of households who earned less than R600 per month, while 59.7% had Std. 3 or lower qualification. Put differently, 11.03% of all South Africans who cam less than R600 per month claimed to belong to the ZCC, as did 12.9% of all South Africans who had Standard 3 or less (HSRC Survey 1993) .
Ethnic groups arc distributed evenly throughout the AICs. Of thos e who belong to AICs, some 36% were Swati-and Ndcbcle-spcakcrs. Xhosa-speakers comprised the largest single language group within the Ethiopian churches at 39.4% . Within the Apostolic churches, (Northern) Sotho-speakers form the largest group (37.4%). Of those in the "Other Independent church es" category, 42.8% were Zulu-sp eakers (HSR C Survey, 1993) .
TYPICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE AICs
The emergence of AICs within Africa as a whole can be pcriodiscd in terms of three peaks: the 1880s, 1914 -1925 , and 1930 to the present (compare Jules-Rosette 1989 . Dan cel argues that the Ethiopian AICs were strongest betwe en 1890 and 1920, and started declining from the 1930s (Dancel 1987:45,53 ) .
In South Africa Zionist churches emerged between 1917 -1927 , and were at first localis ed in the northern provinces (De Wet 1994:152) . The growth of Zionist..:; occurred from 1920 on (Dancel 1987:38,40,45) . From the 1930s on, AICs became the fastest growing sector in the religious market. The Shona Zionists grew fastest during this period (Dancel 1987:55) . Southern Xhosa-speaking regions (Ciskci and Transkci) proved more resistant -although "a few Zionist churches ... occurred in the Transkci from about the 1930s" (De Wet 1994:152) .
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During the period from 1960 to 1980 AI Cs gained more followers in the southern areas, so that 2-5% of the Ciskci and 10-15% of the Transkci population had becom e members, of whom 71 % were Zionist-Apostolic (De Wet 1994:153) . Between 1939 and 1955 the number of AICs doubled (from 600 to 1286 respectively) (And erson 1992:58) . By the 1950s Zionist and Ethiopian AICs "were powerful forces" in Nata l and Transvaal (De Wet 1994:152) . Their growth accelerated after 1955, doublin g in five years to 2 200 in 1960, and slowing down between 1960 and 1970 (Dancel 1987:38,40 ,4 5), increasing to "only" 3000 in 1970 (Anderson 1992:58) .
Among the better known arguments for why AI Cs emerged arc those of Bengt Sundklcr (1961) and David Barrett (1968) , which have been adequately summari sed by Dan cel (1987) , Da Silva (1993) , Prctorius (1995) , and critiqu ed by Kruss (1985) . Th e reasons vary from individual motivations to institutional innovation, and tend to focus on intraand inter-societal factors.
In this section the more frequently cited explanations will be covered in general terms, with those that arc useful for the theme of globalization referr ed to lat er on. Th e emergence of AICs has been explained in cultural, political, and economic terms, typically associated with the impact of a capitalist economy, a colonial political structure, and an alien religi ous belief system on African societies. Other commonl y cited factors arc: (a) disappointment with Christianity; (b) translation of the Bible into different indigenous languages; ( c) denominational divisions, and a failur e to meet loca l needs; ( d) a desire for physical healing; ( c) a desire for community (Jules-Rosette 1989: 148) The variation among AICs in rel ation to historical changes and to location should be accounted for in any attempt to construct a theory about their origin and development. In addition, the factors that lead to the emergence of AICs arc not necessarily those that sustain them, or that characterise later stages of their history (Dancel 1987:68) . For instance, Ethiopian churches emerged as a response of protest against white dominati on, and initially expressed a pan-Africanist desire for liberation which slowly dissipat ed and is missing from current Ethiopian church es (Dancel 1987:38, 51 ). Yet among the Shona AICs of Zimbabwe protest did not play a significant causal role. AICs in West Africa represented security in "the midst of crumbling traditional structures " (Dancel 1987:71) .
Among the more typical arguments for the emergence and grov,,rth in the number of AICs are the following:
1. Prolonged contact between non-indigenous and African belie f systems (embedded in Western cultural systems). The growth of AICs fit the function of religion as a fom1 of cultural defense, which arises in a context in which ethnic identity is perceived as under threat (cf. Wallis & Bruce 1992:17-8) . So even the present non-racial ideology of the African National Congress (ANC) may contribute to the growth of AICs under the Zulua hypothesis which awaits empirical confirmation by a longitudinal breakdown of AIC growth according to ethnic grouping. AICs accept and promote certain traditional beliefs and ways oflife, which contrast with the dismissive attitudes towards these matters within the mainline churches (cf. West 1975 ). Yet contact and social change by themselves cannot be the only major causal factors; the extent, persistence, intensification, "interference by the out-group", and level of tolerance towards change should be added (Dancel 1987:79) .
2. Cultural re::,ponses to secularisation. Jules-Rosette aq,,rucs that the multiplication of new African religious movements (of which AICs are one form) are cultural respons es to secularisation, which take one of four fom1s (1989:156-7): a. neotraditionalism, in which references to an idealised past are us ed to re -estab lish an authoritative tradition (such as African Traditional Religion); b. revitalisation, in which new religious concepts arc used to renew older traditional ones (e.g. AICs, fitting ancestors into new cosmology alongside God). This repr esents a cultural attempt to rc-sacralizc "dominant traditional symbols" through preserving "customary notions of community and conventional expressive symbols": c. syncrctism, in which old and new concepts arc combined; d. mill enarism, in which an ideal future is posited, with new definitions of the sacred and a new social order. Millcnarism represents a cultural attempt to redefine social and political valu es .
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Because African New Reli gious Movements (NRMs) involve the adjustment of Western reli gious systems, or the addition of new doctrinal systems to the Western ones, they represent Africaniscd forms of religious identity -not W cstcrniscd forms of African religions. Discussions of AICs tend to view the alteration of African values and forms of social organisation in terms of change towards Western forms. Instead, Jules-Rosette argues that AICs represent the adaptation of W cstcrn forms to the African context. The ultimate outcome envisaged here is that new forms of identities arc emerging, which combine African and W cstcrn clements. They contribute towards "new forms of cultural expression, such as discourse and dress" (Jules-Rosette 1989:159) . Similarly Lamin Sannch (1994) argues that the translation of the Scriptures in Western Africa led to indigenous languages being held in a high regard in African c hurchcs, which contributed to the development of resistance to colonialism. Jules-Rosette regards secularisation as a result of modernisation, which is also a spin-off from globalization.
Jules-Rosette argues that where AICs engage in fundamentalist Scriptural interpretations, this "serves to develop a new fabric of ideas through which individuals attempt to create alternative types of social relationships" (Jules-Rosette 1989: 159) . According to Sannch, Christianity-through translation of the Scripture into indigenous languages -opened up new possibilities for Africans to define themselves. Pride in indigenous languages bolstered nationalist movements in their struggle against colonialism. An African content is given to doctrine and leadership structures -e.g. in Nigeria in the Native Baptist Church movement from 1888 onwards, and in the Aladura revival in Y orubaland between 1928 -1930 (Sannch 1994 . African religious identities in West Africa have been changed in different ways through contact with Islam and Christianity.
According to Jules-Rosette (1989) developments in African religions in fact affirm African robustness in resisting, creating, and adapting to changing environments. From this perspective AICs represent the emergence of a new African identity, which spans traditional and modern cultural practices. The innovation of AICs lies in "unique forms of social and political organization" and in the development of their own doctrines (JulesRoscttc 1989:149) . AICs in Zaire (Kimbanguism) and the Ivory Coast (Harrist Church) have supported political movement~. In South Africa the members of most Zionist churches individually supported the ANC, according to a pre-election poll.
2. After a wide-ranging systematic study of 336 "tribal" units, David Barrett suggested a general theory based on the conclusion that the primary cause of AIC growth was as a reaction to missionary activities. His thesis is that "indcpcndcncy is a societal reaction to mission arising out ofa tribal zeitgeist or climate of opinion in which Christian missions were believed to be illegitimately mounting an attack against African traditional society and in particular its basic unit, the family" (Barrett 1968:74) . According to Barrett national, "tribal", and mission factors all play a role. National factors that produced AICs occurcd in societies that had a large number of Protestant missionaries, a relatively high ratio of whites to black~, higher standards ofliving for whites than black~, and a high percentage oflitcratcs. "Tribal" factors included polygamous tribes with ancestor worship. Mission factors included regions where missionaries had been working for a long period, and the Bible had been translated into an indigenous language (Dancel 1987:73-5) .
The individual religious motivations of those who start or join AICs should not be neglected. Dancel contests that AICs flourish because they present a vigourous, indigenous, and "symbolically intelligible" alternative religion which docs not reject all traditions out of hand. This recalls Cox's comment about the growth of pentecostalcharismatic churches: that they grow because they offer a comforting emphasis on a miracle-working God which can deal with people in the here and now (Cox 1995) .
[Page 109] Journal of World-Systems Research 3. Some researchers contend that the social stmcture ofjJarticular ethnic groupings favour the.formation ofAICs, e.g. the Tswana and the Swati. In the case of the latter the "custom of a kinship group to secede and become independent on the death of th e head of the family is projected directly onto the structure of the church" (Dancel 1987:69, 86-8) . Similar patterns were noted for the Luo of Kenya and in southern Malawi. Schism is also far more common among Protestant denominations than in the Roman Catholic Church, although not exclusively so, as breakaways in Zambia and Zaire in the 1950s -60s show (Dancel 1987:88) .
Passive resistance to white political domination and cultural control of colonial church stmctures.
In South Africa the resistance of Africans to the colonial economi cs and belief systems were highly successful until the destruction of their political systems through warfare (compare Kiernan 1995 , Chidester 1992 , De Wet 1994 . The breakaway from white dominated mainline denominations around the turn of this century indicat e a mixed source of rejection ofracism and assertion of Africanist identity.
5. The growth of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) is related to the continuing urbanisation of rural South Africans. Zionist churches form important bridges in the rural-urban and the Western-African continuums. The link that exists betwe en urbanisation and increasing ZCC affiliation directly contrast.., with the commonly accepted notion that urbanisation contributes to secularisation ( cf. Brown 1992 :4 7). The growing numbers within the AICs confirm that a linkage exists between religious vitality and urbanisation which has not yet levelled off. More Indigenous church es emerged in the urban areas of the Reef "than in any other urban area in the whole of Africa"; obviously due to migra tory labour -this despite AICs being essentially a rural phenomenon, with urban congregations usually established only subsequently (Dan cel 1987: 102-3).
6. The eventual relaxation of legislation, which recently made it easier to register these churches than was the case before (Oosthuizcn 1994) . Claassen has shown how by 1945 "not a single Zionist church had received government recognition" (Claassen 1995:32) .
7. The level <~{intimacy and care offered by Zionist churches -financial and otherwisewhich cannot be matched by larger mainline congregations (cf. Kiernan 1990a).
Two comments need to be made concerning the inherent limitations of these reasons, and their possible contribution to a discussion of the effects of globalization. First, for the most part the causative factors outlined above restrict the focus to economic and political change at the societal level, whether in South Africa or Africa at large. Although global trend.., ( capitalism, colonialism) are touched upon, the expansion and dynamics of such institutions a.., part of a world system are not considered. Second, some concept.., hint atand so could usefully fit in with -globalization. These include acculturative factors, cultural and social disintegration, religious competition within the same area, the structure of tribal organisation, industrialization, urbanization, rising secularism, and rapid social change (Dancel 1987:69-88) .
To better illustrate the articulation of global economic dynamics with cultural change we now turn to De Wct's extended ca..,c study of Zionist-Apostolic in the Transkci . According to De Wet, up to 1980 most people in the Transkei were Babomvu people (compar e 1994:137,161) , as can be illustrated from the low numbers of people in this area who claim to be affiliated to Christianity. As recent as the 1960s, 77% of th e indigenous people living in the eastern Transkci claimed no church affiliation, while the overall figure for rural Transkci areas were between 41.8% and 48% (De Wet 1994:145,149) .
At first the Babomvu were in the majority, managing to maintain traditional cultural practic es by shunning all things Western, including Christianity and Western education. Babomvu would not allow their children to mix with School children, for fear of cultural contamination. They also resisted being drawn into the emerging migrant labour system. Most Babomvu could make a subsistence living on ancestral lands, and practis ed traditional beliefs and cult, for which purposes (among others) cattle were kept. In this way their economic, religious, kinship, and political system intertwined and remained intact, additionally insulated by the remoteness of their rural homestead..:;. Toward..:; the end of the 19th century, social change in the Transkei happened a..:; a result of the cumulative effect of a number of events. A severe drought, crop failure, and cattle disea..:;e destroyed the economic ba..:;e of the Babomvu culture. Slowly the Babomvu were drawn into migrant labour and a monetary economy for short periods, so that they could build up their homestead. When they lived in towns a..:; migrants, they continued to practice a cultural separatism and consumer a..:;ceticism toward..:; all things Western, so that the essential features of the Babomvu ideology remained intact (De Wet 1994: 137 ,146) . Abantu Babomvu dressed differently, "kept apart from school and town people", and only bought western good..:; a..:; wa..:; necessary (De Wet 1994:148) . The Babomvu ideology wa..:; retained through the development of rites of pa..:;sage, departure, and purification -which ca..:;t the new migratory experience in a traditional light, a..:; McAllister (1980) ha..:; described (De Wet 1994:147) .
Under a development program known a..:; the Betterment Schemes, proclaimed in the 1930s and implemented in the 1950s and 1960s, people were moved from their traditional homesteads into towns, were they had to live next to strangers instead of kin. This severely disrupted their land-ba..:;ed ancestral cult. They were given limited grazing land for cattle, and, in ignorance of the role of cattle in maintaining ritual and political structures through the kinship system, many were forced to reduce their herd..:; (De W ct 1994:151).
Subsequently the material and relational ba..:;c underpinning the Babomvu worldvicw wa..:; substantially weakened. Their geographical insulation wa..:; broken with the cxtc nsion of road..:;, telephones, radio services, and education systems throughout the Transkci (De Wet 1994:150) . No longer able to survive through subsistence, they became incrca..:;ingl y drawn into migrant labour. The longer absences of males from hom e made maintaining the ancestral cult even more difficult.
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Accordin g to De Wct's interpr etation, in this situation of extreme social change, the worldvicw of the Abantu Babomvu could no longer adequately service their altered needs and they were forced to adopt another. Unwilling to a..:;similat c to Western culture, to opt for the mission Christianity of the School people, or the Ethiopian alternativ e and the radical rejection of ancestral bclicfa which that would entail, they incrca..:;ingly found a home in Zionism (De Wet 1994:152) . Zionism offered a midwa y route between preserving selected traditional pract ices and an Africaniscd Christianity a..:; vehicle for adjusting to a modernising environment. De Wet's arguments can be summarised as follows: in the initial period the Babomvu was able to resist alteration to their traditional structures and belief systems by sustaining their material conditions and cultural isolation, supported by the construction of a vigorous worldview. During the second phase the material and political base of the Babomvu were undermined, causing alterations in ritual and social patterns. Finally, due to increasing participation in migrant labour and cultural pressure, the Babomvu had to abandon most of the old worldview for a Zionist-Apostolic ideology, yet managed to retain some older ritual aspects (De Wet 1994:154) .
In other words, Zionist churches emerged in the Transkei of the early 1930s, but became visible only in the 1950s; and grew significantly between 1960 and 1980. Dependency on wage labor increased between 1910 and 1930, so that by the late 1930s about a quarter of all economically active males were involved. This period saw the emergence of a small number of Zionist churches in the Transkei. Labor migrancy was spurred on by the implementation of Betterment Schemes between the 1950s and 1960s, coinciding with an increase in Zionist affiliation. By the 1980s some 80% of all males over the age of 16 were engaged in migrant labour, by which time 10-15% of the population of the Transkei had affiliated with AICs -of which 71 % were Zionist-Apostolic.
GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORIES
In what follows, I will depend heavily on Bcycr's succinct summaries of the contributions of four proponents of globalization theory: Immanuel Wallcrstcin, Roland Robertson, John Meyer, and Nikia~ Luhmann. Readers should note that Bcycr's summary, although generally accurate, is his interpretation of the theorists. I follow his argument here to the extent that it furthers my consideration of the global effects on AICs.
The primary feature of globalization theory is that its unit of analysis is the entire globe, perceived a~ a single social system with distinct properties which constrain and enable all other social forms such a~ politics and cultures (Beyer 1994:14,16 ). Robertson argues that there arc four possible ways for "conceiving global order" on the ba~is ofTocnnics' cla~sic Gcmcinschaft/Gcscllschaft distinction (Beyer 1994:28) . These account for how societies perceive their own ideal order, and for how the global system should look (Beyer 1994:28): a. one Gcmcinschaft ( communitarian) image is of a system of "closed societal communities" and "more or less incommunicable identities" (Beyer 1994:29) . A second Gcmcinschaft image desires "a single global community (Beyer 1994:29): b. one Gcscllschaft image views the global system a~ "an a~sociation of open societies" (Beyer 1994:29) . A second Gcscll~chaft image is of a global order deliberately organised a~ a system, e.g. under a world government (Beyer 1994:29) . c. in terms of substituting a part for the whole ( e.g. Meyer's polity).
Globalization theories can loosely ( and somewhat inaccurately) be grouped into those which focus on centripetal processes which draw the world into a single place, resulting in the concentration of power and capital in certain states; and centrifugal processes which decentralize power and capital.
Globalization as a centripetal processes that leads to the continuous expansion of the global economic system Globalization theories which focus on centripetal processes describe the continuous expansion of the global economic system (Wallcrstcin), accompanied by the consequent globalization of cultural structures (Robertson) , technological structures (Meyer), and religious structures (Beyer 1994) . As a consequence the core is strengthened while the relative weaknesses of the peripheries are reproduced. As a result, Western cultural forms dominate local material and non-material cultural forms.
The global :.ystem as a world-economy -Immanuel Wallerstein
For Wallcrstein, the global system is a world-economy with a single division oflabour, which emerged in Western Europe in the 15th century. For Wallcrstcin nation-states arc a "dependent function" of "a single logic of the world-economy" (Beyer 1994:18) . The world-economy led to the rise of the modern nation-state, and created three geographical divisions: the periphery, the scmipcriphcry, and the core. States do not control the worldcconomy but arc themselves controlled by it (Beyer 1994:17) . The position of a nationstatc in the global division oflabor determines its place (in the core, periphery, scmipcriphcry), strength, and its position in the class structure of the world-economy. So, for example, scmipcriphcral areas function as a middle class. The world-economy is driven by class conflict, disguised as racial or ethnic conflict by a global "ideas-system". Globalization has been described as a historical-political project driven by the state managers of the core in conjunction with their counterparts in the periphery (McMichacl 1996) .
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Core states arc complex, exhibiting mixed economics and combining high technologies with high wages. Periphery nation-states supply the core with staples and raw materials, and arc characterised by low wages and obsolete technology. Semi periphery states ( e.g. Brazil) form a permeable barrier between the core and periphery, exploiting the periphery and being exploited by the core. The scmipcriphcry prevents wholesale revolt thus stabilising the system. Core states redistribute wealth internally, in order to protect the vested interests of the ruling class. Periphery states arc generally-speaking weak, as their ruling cla..,scs arc often complicitous with the ruling cla..,scs of core states, who also subvert the peripheries through various mca..,urcs (Beyer 1994:18) .
Another dependent function is the emergence of an idea.., -system to overcome contradictions in the world-economy. The world-economy requir es both the removal of all social barriers that hinder the operation of the market, and the unequal distribution of wealth necessary for the accumulation of capital. The universalistic-egalitarian idea.., promoted by the first requirement arc countered by particularistic-in egalitarian notions generated by the idca..,-systcm, such a.., race, ethnicity, and nationalism. These cultural notions arc so pcrva..,ivc that anti-systemic movements that oppose the world-economy cannot but take them into account (Beyer 1994: 18) .
The world-economy is characterised by cyclical trends, driven by cla..,s conflict between those who benefit from it, and those who do not (Beyer 1994:18) . But cycles also result from the contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism needs "constant expansion to maintain profit margins 11 , and new economic opportunities have to be found continually-"often in different area"" (Beyer 1994:19) . This process causes economic upturns and downswings (Beyer 1994: 19) .
The world-5ystem as a system of nation-states -John J\Ieyer
In John Meyer's version of globalization theory, the globe is understood a.., a system of nation states -what Robertson calls a world-political culture (Robertson 1994:105) . Herc a nation-state's internal strength is not determined by its position in the division of labor of the world-economy. Inst ead, the degree to which it conforms to world norms determines whether its legitimacy is accepted by other states (Beyer 1994:23) . Legitimacy is a reward for conforming to two particular world cultural norms: equality and progress. States that profess conformity to these norms arc allowed internal monopolies of power. So, for Meyer it is possible that strong, centraliz ed states can develop in the periphery -not only at the core (Beyer 1994:23) .
In other words, the world-polity system functions independentl y of the world-economic system, a-; illustrated by the internal dynamics of states. That is, it contains two logics: polity and economics. Further, Meyer believes that the world polity is decentralis ed, and is held together by a world culture (Beyer 1994:25) . Meyer's arguments arc made possible by his theoretical distinction between polity and economy, ba-;cd on different systems of value creation (Beyer 1994:22) . The economy creates value through commodification, while the polity creates value through collective authority, by constructing and bestowing value on selected activities. These values are not dete nnin cd by market forces, but by the authority of the polity. For example, the state a-; a dominant agent of collective authority can place a high value on social services. Politics include religious and cultural organisations (Beyer 1994:22) .
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For Roland Robertson globalization is a process that results in a global culture. He defines globalization a-; "the overall process by which the entire world becomes increa-;ingly interdependent, so a-; to yield a 'single place' ... a world society"'. So, "subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with reference to this encompa-;sing whole. This is what Robertson means by relativi zation" . Globalization relativizes identi ties: national identities can now be constructed only by reference to "the global system of societies", while individual identities have to refer to "humankind ". In other words, globalization universalizes the particular (distinct national/individual identities) andparticularises the universal (global order/humankind) (Beyer 1994:27,28 ).
The globalization process involves a paradox: (a) the world becomes a single place, in which (b) the expectation exists that societies "'should have dis tinct identiti es"' (Beyer 1994:28) . The process is not supported by a single dominant image of global order, supplied by a world culture. Instead, societies construct their own images (national identities), which not only reflect what the world should be like, but conflict with those of others (Beyer 1994:27) . In the ir attempts to deal with these conflicting im ages, a glob al culture is produced around the idea that the world is a global whole (Beyer 1994:27) .
According to Robertson five pha-;es can be distinguished in the development of globalization:
a. a germinal pha-;c (15-18th C) through b. an incipient phase (mid-18th C) to 1870s), c. a take-off phase ( 1870s to mid-l 920s), d. a struggle for hegemony phase (mid-l920s to latc-l960s), to c. an uncertainty phase (late 1960s to early 1990s) (Robertson 1994:58-59 ).
Robertson believes that religion can encourage the formation of particular nationalindividual identities, or provide world theologies that promote an inclusive view of humankind (Beyer 1994:29,30 ). Globalization causes church-state tensions, as reli gion is becoming increasingly politicised, while politics arc becoming increasin gly th cologiscd (Beyer 1994:30) . Jules-Rosette raises a similar point when speaking about rcsacrali sing, which includes political goals.
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The world :,ystem as a g lobal society -Nik/as Luhmann N ikla<; Luhmann argues that a global society exists because communication "ext ends continuously around the globe" (Beyer 1994:3 l) . In other words, Luhmann provides insight into the structure of global society (Beyer 1994:33) . He argues that soc iety is a social system, in which actions occur, ba<;cd on meaningful communication (Beyer 1994:30) . And so "incrca<;ingly, meaningful communication can and often docs take place between any two points" (Beyer 1994:30) . Communication, in turn, depends on relatively stable social structur es , ba<;cd on expectat ions (Beyer 1994:36) . The kind of communi cation that ha<; become globalizcd is cognitive or adaptive; c .g. scientific, technical, news, trave l (Beyer 1994:36) . Modernization leads to globali zation, and so to a world society (Beyer 1994:38) .
One of the most important shifts from pre-modern to modern soc ieties is from a nonnati ve to a cognitive (learning) way of responding to disappointed expectations (Beyer 1994:37) . Learning is incrca<;ingly important in mod ern social structures (B eyer 1994:36) . Another shift is from the dominance of stratifi ed differentiation to that of functional differentiation (Beyer 1994:34) : i. In stratifi ed differentiatio n, , people arc ranked on the ba<;is of status, so that the ir actions are interpreted accor ding to strata membership. Stratifi ed societies arc characte ri sed by the dominance of a ruling strata, who control most of the power. The boundaries of soc iety is determined by "the reach of their communication" (Beyer 1994:35);  ii. In functional differentiation people and their actions are categorised on the ba-.is of the function that they fulfill in specific (political, economic, educational, religious) systems (Beyer 1994 :35) . Such systems "specialize in specific modes of communication" (Beyer 1994:37) . By implication, this sets boundaries which arc relativel y independ ent from one another, so that one system cannot control others. The "only boundary that remains possible for the cncompa-.sing societal system is then the globe itself' (Beyer 1994:38) . World society is characterised by "the dominance of functionall y differentiated subsystems" (Beyer 1994:40) .
Globalization as centrifugal processes that lead to radical fragmentation
In contra-.t to the above, other globalization theories exist that focus on centrifugal processes which arc seen to radically realign the world-system. Fundam ental changes are brought about by a decentralisation of capital, which weakens the center while strengthening the periphery (Friedman 1994) . Whether viewed in terms of centrifugal or centripetal conceptualizations of the world-system, the notion that the shift began in 1970 seems widely supported (compare Featherstone 1990) . A particularly relevant a-.pect of Friedman's perspective is the premise that the decline of hegemony leads to an increa-.c in expressions of different cultural and social identities.
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF AICS IN SOUTH AFRICA
My modest intention is to show that globalization contributed to the emergence of AICs by affecting African religious identities through radically altering economic and cultural systems. In other words, in both subsections altered religious identities arc in focus; with the differenc e that in the first subsection this is viewed in terms of global economic trend-.. Changes in African cultural and religious identities arc linked to the initial expansion of the world-economy and its need for cheap migratory labour, sustained by "devel opment" and its drive towar d-. modernization. In the second subsection , global cultural hegemony is the primary focus . The emergence of the AICs a-. new forms of African cultural and religious identities is connected to the cycles of core state hegemon y within the world-polity, accompanied by a global extension of cultural products (e.g. languag e) and institutions (e.g. education, religion).
The im plied separat ion of economy from culture is theoretically possible, but analytically difficult to sustain due to the articulation of the one with the other. Strictl y speaking, econom y ha-. to do with the production, distri bution, and consumption of commodities; while culture ha-. to do with the communal product ion and transmission of patterns of thinking and acting. But the globalization of Western system-. of education, languag e, economy, and religion effected not only the division oflabour between core and periphery and within the periphery, but also radically altered social structures and belief systems.
AJCs and the expansion of the world-economy
In this section, I describe the effect of globalization on African religious and cultural identities by using Africa's incorporation into the world-economy a<; point of departur e. The descriptions arc pcnskctches and largely confined to South Africa; but the unit of analysis remains global. In other word<;, event<; unfolding in South Africa arc viewed against the global system as a primary constraint. By implication, the global system created similar effects elsewhere, such as new religious movem ents across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but these would take different forms depending on the local configurations of e.g. the political economy.
Colonialism was part of the early expansion of the capitalist world-syst em, which led to the formation of nation states in Europe and in the colonies . Pr e-and post-colonial subSaharan African societies were periph erally integrated into the world-economy . This dependency was mirrored internally with the emergence of urban centers and rural peripherie s. "Globalization is not simply a matter of societies, reg ions and civili zations being squeezed together in various problematic ways but also of this occurring w ith increasing int ensity inside nationally constituted societies" (Rob ertson 1994:104) .
By the end of the colonial period the global "hegemony of th e Western free-market economy" had been well established in South Afric a as elsewh ere (Hcugh 1995:33 0) . South Africa was incorporat ed into the world-economic system as part of the periph ery , and exploited by the colonial core for mineral and other commodities -gold export s formed 60% of exports between 1909 -193 7 (Milkm an 1979 . African economic and political systems were radically altered, particularly as the need for cheap labor result ed in the disintegration of ritual systems caused by the absence of male s for extend ed periods from the hom estead due to migrant labor. N ew forms of ritu al develope d to match the new form of labour, so that e.g. rit es of passage emerged around mi grant labor ers' leaving home for urban areas (McAllister 1980) . The large -scale effects on African belief sys tem s were (a) dcsacra lisation of African belief syste ms; (b) stru ctura l differentiation; and the transfer of religious meanin gs to a secu lar settin g (Jules-Rosette 1989; 153). In such a context, the development of indi genou s churche s, prompted by the experience of migrant labourer s at their places of work, "ine vitabl y acquired overto ne s of ethn ic and tribal defianc e" (Van Binsb ergcn 1994: 154 (compare Martin 1990:219; Wallerstcin & Vieira 1992:5; Milkman 1979:262) . After 1948 a manufacturing industry developed, supported by direct foreign investment, restrictions on consumer imports alongside an import substitution industry, and importation ofcapital goods (Milkman 1979:261,266-7) . Yet, by 1972, 60% of all exports continued to be raw materials, of which 37% was gold (Milkman 1979:272) . South Africa's potential to be eventually incorporated into the core was constrained by the policies of the apartheid regime and its failure to take advantage of changes in the world-system -most notably, the movement of manufacturing to the periphery. Stagnation occurred, so that South Africa not only remained in the scmipcriphcry but appears to be spiralling downward due largely to forces beyond its control.
During the apartheid period, an internal form of colonialism racialiscd class divisions. Mamdani ( 1996) proposes that the apartheid state continued the quintessential form of state established in the late colonial period. Just like indirect rule, apartheid created racialiscd urban citizens, with tribalizcd rural subjects under a Native Authority, "supervised by white officials" (Mamdani 1996:287) . "Whites of all political and ideological persuasions" became so "comfortable with the privileges which apartheid offered them in the form of cheap black labor that they found no need to learn African languages -they were in a situation which never demanded that they associate with the African working class as equals at any time" (Maakc 1994:117) . In the post-apartheid era the interests of the ruling class arc increasingly tied to the economic structure, which means that, state policies to the contrary, a change in the conditions of the working classes is unlikely.
State responses to the AICs mostly took the form of non-recognition (Claassen 1995) , and even occasionally direct state opposition. The case of the Israelite massacre at Bulhock demonstrates that AICs were sometimes viewed as potentially disruptive to "civic political commitments by virtue of their ability to mobilize masses of people in activities which arc not directly ... controlled by the state". This mirrored state violence against e.g. the Kimbanguists in the Kongo (Jules-Rosette 1989:155) . South Africa's status in the world-economy is relevant insofar as the movement from periphery to scmipcriphcry was accompanied by increasing rates of incorporation of the African population into migrant labor. De W ct's work shows that in the Transkci region an escalation of migrant labor coincided with increasing affiliation to Zionist churches, so that the first factor seems directly related to the second. Y ct in both of South Africa's world zone incarnations a large segment of migrant labor continued to feed into the mines, first along the Reef and later further afield. South Africa's shift to a scmipcriphcry through post-World War Two industrialisation was accompanied by increasing recruitment of migrant labour. As the major industries, like the major mines, were also initially situated primarily on the Reef, or in the nearby Pretoria and V crccniging urban areas, migrant labourers were drawn to the same region, where they encountered Zionist evangelists. Labor migrants encountered Zionism and took it back home through a point to point diffusion. This explains the emergence of Zionism among low-paid manual workers.
The close link between the spread of AICs and migratory labor can also easily be demonstrated for the rest of Southern Africa, c.g in the founding of AICs in th e 1920s among the Kalanga of Botswana (Dancel 1987 :102, Van Binsbcrgcn 1994 . The establishment of Shona and Swati AI Cs happened through the interlinking of Southern Africa into mining -a function of the core in relation to the periphery in th e global economy. The First Ethiopian Church among the south-ea'ltern Shona in Zimbabw e wa'l founded by Mupambi Chidembo, who as a migrant laborer in the Transvaal from 1890 to 1910 encountered Ethiopians. He returned to Zimbabwe in 1910, ordained a'l bishop, to establish congregations there (Dancel 1987:51) . Similarly, the founder of the African Congregational Church in the Chipinga District had made contact with the Zulu Congregational Church in the 1930s (Dancel 1987:52) . Among the Zionist-type churches, Zimbabwean Zionist churches were established after the experience that their founders (Makamba, Mtisi, Ma'luka) had a'l migrant laborers with the Zion Apostolic Church of South Africa (est. 1917) and with the Zion Apostolic Faith Mission in 1923 (Dancel 1987:54-5, referring to Samuel Mutendi who co-founded the ZCC) .
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While membership of AICs affirm local identiti es, they alter them in significant ways, through rejection of certain traditions and through promoting education and agricultural innovation (Dancel 1987:56) . Conversion in the colonial era wa'l linked to the acceptance of certain economic practices, such a'l commercial agricultur e -and arguably broadly speaking still favors capitalism . To convert from African Traditional Religions (ATRs) and to reject African practices is to become part of a global project which militat es against the expression oflocal identities, structur es, and kinship patterns; i .e. arc modernising (Kritzingcr 1992:301) . In this way AICs contributed to the more individualistic role requir ed by a globalizcd capitalist system, which is one step rem oved from the primary communal cmpha'lis of African Traditional Religions (ATRs) . By contra'lt ATR function to support local identities and maintain s the functions of traditional kinship , economic , and political systems. AICs seem to offer continuity with selected a'lpects of a traditional pa'lt, while orienting their members to the realiti es of the present, a'l shown by Zionist church es in the Transkci.
AJCs and cultural hegemonies in the world -:, ystem
In this section I describe the effect of globalization on African reli gious and cultural identiti es by referring to the establishment of cultural heg emony. Th e effect wa'l to suppress local identi ties through the extension of mcchanism'l of social control, such a'l educat ion and religimL'l institutions . Peter Smith (1986) ha'l theorized that religion is strengthen ed inside a core stat e a'l that state ach ieves hegemony within the world-syst em . Subsequently the core state extends its religious system to the periphery. Th e dominanc e of religion within the world-system waxes and wanes with the fortunes of its core state, a.:; it docs within that state. The dominance of Christianity in sub-saharan Africa is thus the residue of the core states that dominated this region.
When British hegemony wa.:; declining in the world-system, a global conflict ensued to establish a new dominant state in the core. In South Africa, this struggle a.:;sumcd economic, linguistic, and racial forms, evident in e.g. the elevation of English and Afrikaans to official languages and the devaluation of indigcnoLL<; cultural formsincluding belief systems. Mother tongue teaching during the initial years of education in black schools wa.:; replaced by the introduction of both official languages. This structured the racial division of the labor market, while ensuring the effective functioning of the economic market. A small educated black elite cla.:;s wa.:; created, capable of co -operating in the divide and rule strategics over distant rural area.:; and of participating in the extension of Western institutions.
The continuing spread of English a.:; the language of choice in stat e and civil society (despite official multilingual policies) entrenched ela.:;s divisions oflabor, and the corcpcriphcry continuum between metropolitan and rural area.:;. Differ ential access to English, dependent on level of state funding of education, structured and integrat ed marginal groups into the peripheral economy (Tollcfaon 1991: 132-3). South Africa's peripheral incorporation into the world-economy also caused an internal replication of the core-periphery dualism, with the homeland.:; constituting the periphery. BccaLL.:;c this wa.:; accompanied by European cultural and linguistic hegemony, labor migrants who opted to remain outside the education system becam e pcrip hcrally integrated into the economy (a.:; Van Binsbcrgcn demonstrated for the Nkoya of Zambia; Van Binsbcrgcn 1994:147) . AlCs emerged during the late colonial period (1880-1925) a.:; an African initiative to span the rural/urban, African/Western, local (African) and global (W cstcrn) divides generated by the process of globalization. Shifts from traditional African religioLL<; identity to AlCs were linked to attempts to overcome the peripheral position a.:;signcd to Africans in the world-system. Christianity (and Islam) offer ed Africans entry into a global identity through conversion to a world reli gion. Lik e other newer forms of African religion, and unlike mainstream religion at that point in time , AlCs provided possibilities of "inter-ethnic and transcultural a.:;sociativc netw orks" throu gh "overarching symbols and doctrine" (Jules-Rosette 1989:157).
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One effect of globalization on African cultural iden tities wa.:; to promote a.:;similation into the hegemonic culture, seen a.:; inev itable and even desirable. Brandcl-S yricr (19 78) in her study of the emergence of an Afric an elite in a South African township in the 1960s, The globalization of the world-economy causes changes in traditional religious beliefa and authority systems in non-Western societies, as Peter Berger noted (Berg er 1967 :171, referred to in Jules-Rosette 1989 . Yet, as Jules-Rosette argues, these changes arc double-edged, entailing the return to traditional religious concepts which are redefined in a context of "changing political and social demands". Industrialisation is often accompanied by the formation of a substitute pre-industrial kinship group, a reestablishment of mechanical solidarity (cf. Kiernan 1990a , Jules-Ros ette 1989 .
In other words, historical and global processes transform local contexts by pushing certain cultural identities that indigenous peoples need to assume in order to achieve legitimacy in the larger system. Two responses occur: assimilation and resistanc e, which tend to move towards one another over time. The forced choice between alternative identities is also associated with acceptance of alternative economic, political, and social processes. Local political and social processes of state and ethnic formation, along with the pre-industrial mode of production, arc disrupted. The supporting material and cultural (including religious) base of local identity is inhibited, and cla..,s differentiation promot ed. Economic and cultural resistance occurs, cast in more traditional patt erns, with adjustments to incorporate unavoidable newer social relations.
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The extremely strong link that exists between participation in the AICs and the economic position of their members seems to indicat e that membership involves a somewhat transitional structure . Membership is transitional in two senses: increased individual economic welfare militates against continued membership in AICS (Kiernan 1990a ) just as increas ed unemploym ent feeds into the AICS as well, while recruitment of educationally mobile youth intensifies the movement towards modernity. In the first instance, then, membership is transitional in an economic cla..,s sense. People who become economically mobil e leave the movement ; those who lose their jobs or who cannot find employment (an estimated 7 out 100 school-leavers will find formal sector employment in 1998) tend to become affiliated. In the second instance , a shift within the educational standing of members moves the movement as a whole towards a different place, ideologically speaking.
AICs have an anti-systemic function, but this would be radically altered should their members be drawn into the emerging black middle class. Their anti-systemic function is evident to the extent that they resist, perhaps unint entionally, being drawn into globalized identities, and construct alternative identi ties to those offered by either the world-system or by an idealised traditional past. By extending mutual financial care AIC members counter the negati ve local effects of unequal exchange. In contra..,t to mainstr eam Christianity, which arguably contributed to the establishment of a global Europ ean
